17:00:31 #startmeeting Security 17:00:32 Meeting started Thu Oct 8 17:00:31 2015 UTC and is due to finish in 60 minutes. The chair is hyakuhei. Information about MeetBot at http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot. 17:00:33 Useful Commands: #action #agreed #help #info #idea #link #topic #startvote. 17:00:35 The meeting name has been set to 'security' 17:00:39 sup 17:00:41 Heyoooo! 17:00:42 yo 17:00:42 o/ 17:00:43 o/ 17:00:46 #chair tmcpeak 17:00:46 Current chairs: hyakuhei tmcpeak 17:00:47 o/ 17:00:47 Hi 17:00:49 hola 17:00:56 * mhayden stumbles in :) 17:01:05 hey mhayden, good to see you 17:01:06 Welcome mhayden :D 17:01:17 hi 17:01:19 Welcome major 17:01:23 thanks! :) 17:01:27 Hey mhayden 17:01:28 lotsa Rackers today 17:01:28 howdy 17:01:30 major is our special guest star this week :) 17:01:30 :) 17:01:40 ooh, cool 17:01:46 Agenda #link https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/security-20151008-irc 17:01:51 +1 17:01:58 ^ Was feeling sooper organized this morning :) 17:01:59 o/ 17:02:06 Hey redrobot 17:02:15 * redrobot waves at hyakuhei 17:02:23 Do you have the link for that service authentication using PKI spec thing ? 17:02:46 hyakuhei: is there an agenda item for mhayden's stuff? 17:02:49 hyakuhei https://review.openstack.org/#/c/222293/ ? 17:03:05 tmcpeak: Yes 17:03:09 oh sorry, the end 17:03:11 I don't read gud 17:03:11 It’s right there on the agenda :P 17:03:19 Tis ok, you’re still young. 17:03:26 ;) 17:03:29 redrobot: that’s the one thanks! 17:03:58 ok, lets get the ball rolling with Anchor then 17:04:02 #topic Anchor 17:04:16 Not much to report, I think we’ve all been working on other things 17:04:32 dg_: has been doing some interesting related work thats further down the agenda. 17:04:44 The ACME spec is interesting for anyone who cares to look 17:04:55 tkelsey: dg_ anything anchor-ish to add? 17:05:08 not too much, rebased a few patches, thats about i t 17:05:20 hyakuhei I dont think so, we bust out the validators, but i think that was last covered in last wweks meeting 17:05:30 hyakuhei +1 on ACME being interesting 17:05:33 There’s a few open reviews that need addresssing 17:05:45 we have looked at pulling some for the validator functionality into a reusable package 17:05:49 hyakuhei any plans for ACME support in Anchor? 17:05:51 Did Tim use on metal server to test user cases? 17:06:01 redrobot: No immediate ones 17:06:02 Michaelxin: no not yet ;9 17:06:04 :( 17:06:09 been short on time 17:06:17 Michaelxin on metal server? 17:06:22 Ion worry. 17:06:45 yes 17:06:53 Though actually, given the dynamic AuthZ nature (validators) of Anchor, it could actually make a lot of sense, depending on the tertiary proof of ownership methods outlined in the ACME standard 17:07:28 ok, rolling on to Killick (where ACME will still be relevant) 17:07:33 #topic Killick 17:07:39 michaelxin got a link? google doesnt have anything much on that 17:07:41 spec #link # 17:08:01 Stupid etherpad is stupid… link https://review.openstack.org/#/c/231955/ 17:08:10 shohel: !!! 17:08:16 hi 17:08:42 hey shohel 17:08:45 Hey, welcome buddy, @everyone shohel is the main guy that drove the Keystone TA work 17:08:49 http://www.rackspace.com/en-us/cloud/servers/onmetal 17:08:57 thanks michael 17:09:09 so Killick 17:09:19 Any time 17:09:20 * elmiko waves to shohel 17:09:41 welcome back shohel 17:09:58 So dg_ please tell us all about killick 17:10:01 hyakuhei: where was the ACME spec? 17:10:08 (sorry for the interruption) 17:10:42 elmiko https://letsencrypt.github.io/acme-spec/ 17:10:50 redrobot: thanks! 17:11:49 back again, sorry IRC dropped out 17:12:04 No worries, we waited for you 17:12:15 no worries 17:13:02 so we talked about killick briefly a couple of weeks back, the idea is that its a very lgihtweight CA/RA, which can be deployed with minimal infrastructure to build an internal PKI 17:13:18 as an alternative to MS ADCS/dogtag/ejbca, but much lighter weight and without any licensing costs 17:13:40 no licensing costs is good 17:13:45 I've pushed a spec up to the security-specs repo and would appriciate feedback 17:14:08 tmcpeak - I dont want to have to tell customers they need a MS windows license to deploy openstack because PKI 17:14:09 dg__ as mentioned last time, I would rather see this work done in Barbican 17:14:20 dg__ ++ 17:14:25 redrobot: why? 17:14:25 redrobot feel free to pull in the validation functionality 17:14:36 its seperated in anchor 17:14:53 I think validation will be useful to us 17:14:57 Validators, which are really “policy” should probably be enforced at the RA 17:15:10 redrobot: They’re broken out of Anchor now, you can use them already :) 17:15:12 The link to your spec? Please 17:15:14 I'm concerned about adding yet another CA API to OpenStack 17:15:45 Big-Tent baby ;) 17:15:57 #link https://review.openstack.org/#/c/231955/ 17:16:00 Michaelxin: ^ 17:16:11 elmiko ty 17:16:29 +1 17:16:34 Though I do appreciate the concern, now there’s no reason things cant plug into x,y,z like I’d expect Killick to sit behind Barbican and to have a barbican plugin built alongside it as development progresses 17:16:38 Ty 17:16:43 hyakuhei sure, there's a huge tent now... but I think it would make it more difficult for projects to add CA support if they have to do so across 3 different APIs 17:16:56 Agreed 17:17:45 redrobot agreed, but i think theres a very clear distinction for the use-cases 17:17:55 redrobot: is this a situation where castellan, or something similar, could be used to create a useful abstraction? (or is that barbican) 17:18:15 Castellan is the abstraction in front of the abstraction that is Barbican… 17:18:18 So possibly? 17:18:20 lol 17:18:49 we've gone down that road... I think it would be difficult to provide a one-size-fits-all abstraction on top of a CA 17:18:51 the cert stuff had come up in castellan before, but i think it was a different use case. which is why i mention "or something similar" 17:19:18 redrobot: ack 17:19:25 redrobot: last I read (which was some time ago) Barbican still wanted to be the middlman to various certificate authorities? 17:19:35 dg__ so a deployer interested in both Killick and Anchor and Barbican use cases would still have to deploy all 3 17:19:36 redrobot anchor is ideally suited for node-node communications, or instance to instance communications, killick is for when you want to have a bit more oversight of whats being issued manually, where you want more functionality than just issuing a self-signed cert with openssl, but without the extra functionality of a barbican CA 17:20:12 potentially, depending on the functionality he needed 17:20:16 s/both/all 17:20:20 is it worthwhile to document how these systems differ, can integrate and where they overlap 17:20:28 mvaldes: +1 17:20:32 +1 17:20:46 this might get rat-hole-y but I'm interested 17:20:48 +1 17:20:52 (even if just on the wiki) 17:20:52 Venn diagrams! :) 17:20:54 mvaldes: +1 17:20:58 Im unaware of the state of the art with barbican as a PKI, I havent tried to deploy it in 6 months or so, but last time I looked, it didnt seem to be something I could use as an alternative to ADCS 17:21:11 mvaldes +1 17:21:12 I’ll make some time for it in my summit talk, a slide on what’s available PKI wise today. 17:21:20 Anyone is using killick in production? 17:21:24 It’s a spec 17:21:28 so no :) 17:21:36 or “god I hope not..." 17:21:52 i think ccneill can help with the barbican side of it 17:21:54 :) 17:21:56 dg__ so barbican is not itself a CA. And I do believe that having a CA that you can stand up for free is valuable. The part I don't like is that it having an api that competes with the Barbican API 17:22:10 dg__ I would prefer to see killick as a backend to Barbican 17:22:11 So I think it should go both ways 17:22:21 Those who only want one type of CA can have it 17:22:33 Certainly don’t want a lightweight CA to require Barbican in order to deploy 17:22:36 That’s dumb 17:22:38 mvaldes: pretty sure redrobot is the better person to expound on barbican, though I'm happy to help wherever I can 17:22:50 redrobot does barbican have a gui I can log into, view the status of a certificate request that has been submitted by a user, and issue or deny the certificate? 17:22:54 but where there’s a few different CA use cases, being able to put them behind barbican makes a lot of sense. 17:23:40 dg__ no... again Barbican is currently not a CA, so we are not concerned with Cert Issuance beyond getting a status from the CA 17:24:20 so if I want to issue a certificate, I request it from barbican as a user? then barbican passes the request to killick? 17:24:40 dg__ yes, that's the workflow for Public CAs right now. 17:24:51 dg__ dogtag for example. 17:25:17 yup 17:25:18 dg__ user interacts with Barbican, Barbican talks to DogTag... DogTag admins do their thing directly with DogTag. 17:25:48 Depends if you’re intending this to be an as-a-Service for users of your cloud or more of an under-cloud infrastructure type component I guess. 17:25:51 that feels like a load of extra abstraction when all I want to do is to curl a CRL to a url... 17:26:14 I think there are use cases for both 17:26:15 dg__ you'll still be curling a CRL to a barbican URL 17:26:28 ok cool 17:27:00 but if killick has a decent stabilized API I can’t see why it would have to be tightly coupled with Barbican? Though I would certainly encourage people to write a Barbican plugin for it 17:27:13 hyakuhei: should we set an action item for documentation of barbican, anchor, killick? i can see these questions coming up a lot 17:27:26 hyakuhei my main concern is for projects having to make a decision on whether they need to integrate with Barbican or with Killick 17:27:53 My main concerns is making sure they have that option I think 17:27:53 a solid concern 17:28:02 redrobot - i see this as more of a anchor or !anchor descision 17:28:16 Although, pretty quickly you end up with another Castellan situation I guess. 17:28:24 hyakuhei and if projects start diverging, some integrate with Barbican, some integrate with Killick, then deployment becomes a pain in the rear 17:28:25 as otherwise, you just want a traditional certifcate, which means generating a CRL and curling that to an interface somewhere 17:28:25 dg__: Is the plan to support Keystone AuthN ? 17:28:28 yep 17:28:47 I have a place holder in the spec for thinking about auth, as I havent addressed that yet 17:28:54 redrobot: Sure does but there’s no way we’d tell DogTag that it has to integrate with Barbican 17:28:55 guys this is good stuff but we should probably move on 17:29:00 tmcpeak: +1 17:29:05 we still have a large agenda and want to make sure to get to mhayden 17:29:07 ML or #openstack-security 17:29:16 no worries if i'm left off ;) 17:29:19 hyakuhei: +1 17:29:22 nonesense. 17:29:32 one last thing: 17:29:52 I would reconsider my opposition to Killick if the API is ACME compliant. 17:30:05 redrobot that is the plan, going forwards at least 17:30:08 Fair enough :) worth considering 17:30:11 Righto 17:30:21 * hyakuhei bumps OpenStack-Ansible-Security 17:30:23 * redrobot will read the spec 17:30:27 #topic Ansible-Security 17:30:30 #link https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:open+project:openstack/openstack-ansible-security,n,z 17:30:40 mhayden: what’s all this about then ? :P 17:30:48 +1 17:30:51 this looks interesting 17:31:05 ah yes -- so the general idea is in the spec 17:31:07 let me dig up the link 17:31:30 http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/openstack-ansible-specs/specs/mitaka/security-hardening.html 17:31:35 #link http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/openstack-ansible-specs/specs/mitaka/security-hardening.html 17:31:55 interesting... and cool 17:31:57 the goal is to provide some level of security hardening for the hosts that run an OpenStack infrastructure 17:32:02 mhayden: good stuff! 17:32:02 and something auditable 17:32:08 awesome, and Ansible based? 17:32:14 so we went with the RHEL 6 STIG since it's public domain content 17:32:17 yes, it's ansible 17:32:22 meant to go hand in hand with openstack-ansible 17:32:24 good work 17:32:25 cool, Ansible seems perfect for this 17:32:40 currently, it's in a WIP state with maybe 80 controls left to assess out of 270-ish total 17:32:41 Cool 17:32:47 is there any testing implemented for this? 17:32:53 translating RHEL 6 STIGs into Ubuntu 14.04 is... interesting 17:32:59 as in, something that checks the system after it's deployed 17:32:59 bknudson: the idea is to make a XCCDF for OpenSCAP 17:33:14 mhayden: yeah, for sure, I bet that's time consuming 17:33:19 have you had any that just don't translate 17:33:20 ? 17:33:25 ah, alphabet soup 17:33:25 putting enterprise security around Ubuntu 14.04 is a bit like putting a sweater on a cat -- you know it can be done, but you will get scratched in the process :) 17:33:35 tmcpeak: yes, some don't translate 17:33:45 there are docs for each and every change made 17:33:55 http://openstack-ansible-security.readthedocs.org/en/latest/ 17:34:04 mhayden: how much of that is 14.04 _specific_ or just dealing with more general Ubuntu idiosyncracies? 17:34:04 (there will be a formal home for those docs soon) 17:34:11 this looks like a ton of work 17:34:13 i have a feeling there's also some missing coverage when translated to a new platform with different defaults 17:34:19 +1 17:34:21 hyakuhei: Ubuntu 14.04 specific for now, because that's what openstack-ansible supports :( 17:34:43 mhayden: just two of you working on it? 17:34:44 fungi: very true -- those are tough to catch but the STIG is quite comprehensive 17:35:05 tmcpeak: mainly met at the moment, but i have some help from a coworker occasionally 17:35:12 he's tasked with some other things 17:35:34 I really like this idea 17:35:41 Very interesting, I don’t have any ansible experience. Not sure what the rest of the team is like. 17:35:48 general process going forward: 1) get all the controls in there, 2) refactor where it makes sense, 3) get some kind of auditing 17:35:49 I'm personally interested in helping with this, and I suspect others here might be too 17:35:55 My team can help. Major. 17:35:57 one idea is to do ansible-playbook with -C for auditing 17:35:59 Well, not a lot of hands-on. I’d like to upskill on it too 17:36:15 hyakuhei: Ansible is worth learning for sure 17:36:27 the biggest help i need now is on reviews 17:36:29 +1 17:36:33 to ensure i'm meeting the spec of the STIG properly 17:36:40 or documenting the exceptions well enough 17:36:49 mhayden: I'll carve a few hours to work on this 17:36:56 i hope to have the remainig controls into the repo by next wed 17:36:59 please add me to any reviews that could use help 17:36:59 happy to help mhayden 17:37:00 or at least proposed 17:37:06 thanks, everyone! 17:37:12 tmcpeak: I have a working knowledge for auditing things but don’t want other people to have to rely on my recipies … 17:37:14 reviews remaining-> https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:open+project:openstack/openstack-ansible-security,n,z 17:37:21 hyakuhei ;) 17:37:23 this is great 17:37:35 there's a push to get OSAD possibly onto Fedora/RHEL/CentOS from what i hear 17:37:39 so that could expand the role a bit 17:37:46 since no stig exists for RHEL/CentOS 7 17:37:48 Yeah I think it’s going to be super useful. What project is the repo under at the moment ? 17:38:03 hyakuhei: https://github.com/openstack/openstack-ansible-security 17:38:08 mhayden: I will take a crack on these tomorrow morning 17:38:10 it's a child under openstack-ansible 17:38:14 tmcpeak: many thanks! 17:38:26 mhayden: thanks for getting this going, and open source 17:38:30 this will be really valuable for security 17:38:31 no problem 17:38:38 very interesting 17:38:40 we tried to do CIS, but that kinda fell apart due to licensing + terms of use :/ 17:38:45 tmcpeak: This might make another interesting article 17:38:46 tmcpeak: +1 17:38:51 mhayden: I meant more in terms of http://governance.openstack.org/reference/projects/index.html 17:38:54 hyakuhei: +1 17:39:01 hyakuhei: openstackansible 17:39:05 ah sorry I see above it’s under openstack-ansible :) 17:39:10 sorry, no security, need a license for that 17:39:13 that's okay -- i'm typing fast! :) 17:39:35 i sent mail to legal-discuss about CIS and discussed it with CIS directly -- sounds like a no-go 17:39:36 So I think we’re all agreed this is exciting stuff 17:39:41 this seems fairly labor intensive, but once we have it should be hugely beneficial for everyone 17:39:42 :( 17:39:43 awesome 17:39:45 hyakuhei++ 17:39:52 well hopefully i can join the meeting next week and report some nifty progress ;) 17:39:57 thank y'all for the time during your meeting 17:40:00 I wonder what the matintainence / testing burden wil lbe like 17:40:09 thanks for the intro mhayden =) 17:40:15 de nada :) 17:40:15 hyakuhei: I could see setting up automation for testing easily 17:40:37 the big thing is going to be absorbing new OS and stigs 17:40:43 tmcpeak: current openstack-ansible PTL has a review in with os-infra for automated testing 17:40:57 mhayden: oh awesome, way ahead already then :) 17:41:08 cool 17:41:23 +1 17:41:24 tmcpeak: odyssey4me gets the credit there ;) 17:41:35 Ok, I think we need to press on 17:41:38 I change my vote from this is "great" to this is "awesome" 17:41:43 haha thanks, bknudson 17:41:45 lol, nice bknudson 17:41:48 Thank you mhayden - extremely interesting work! 17:41:53 lol 17:41:53 you're welcome 17:41:56 yeah good stuff 17:42:01 looking forward to getting involved in this 17:42:06 #topic Bandit 17:42:11 #link https://review.openstack.org/#/q/bandit+status:open,n,z 17:42:17 tkelsey: roll it 17:42:19 tmcpeak tkelsey 17:42:34 we're looking to push a new version like… now 17:42:35 0.14.0 17:42:45 scrambling to get docs and other outstanding changes and bug fixes 17:42:59 once those are done (hopefully tomorrow) I'll run through testing using our new tool 17:43:03 then push 0.14.0 17:43:06 nice 17:43:35 hey 17:43:38 sorry 17:43:39 there he is 17:44:00 tkelsey, coding in the other conference room as usual? ;) 17:44:02 yeah im pushing on docs to get as muh in for a version we plan to roll tomorrow 17:44:11 elmiko: lol :) 17:44:52 Cool, anything else ? 17:44:53 we have a lot of stuff building up, so now is a good time to push a new version, we have just been waiting on the docs really 17:45:19 (We’ve got a lot of agenda to run through thanks to the spirited Killick debate and the ansible awesomeness) 17:46:00 I guess that’s that for Bandit? 17:46:00 that should be about it 17:46:02 roll it ;) 17:46:04 cool :) 17:46:11 yup thats it 17:46:17 #topic OSSN 17:46:20 #link https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:open+project:openstack/security-doc,n,z 17:46:41 Not too many left open now (that’s the whole security doc project, wasn’t sure how to filter it) 17:46:59 OSSN-0057 could use some love 17:47:05 In the interests of time I’ll just say please take a look through over coffee and see if anything obviously needs a -/+1 17:47:18 #link https://review.openstack.org/#/c/219901/ 17:47:25 browne: ack, added to the queue ;) 17:47:33 thanks browne I’ll take a look tomorrow too 17:47:44 sicarie: Anything to report on dox? 17:48:10 Hmm, I guess not (good time-saving skills!) 17:48:11 We've identified the case studies and the security checklists as our "must-have's" before the Tokyo summit 17:48:15 Sorry, was typing 17:48:26 I think compute is pretty much updated 17:48:27 oh cool 17:48:48 And I'll be messing with rst2pdf for the week before the summit, try to get the leaf version out around that time 17:49:01 Sounds great! 17:49:02 Right guys, I’m going to move to the most important thing next because we need to discuss or at least start to discuss 17:49:07 #topic SummitSched 17:49:20 Please take a look at #link https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/security-mikata-scheduling 17:50:41 Add your name at the bottom of you’re going to be in Tokyo and add a suggestion for fishbowl/worksessions 17:50:59 I’ve added would-attend too so you can “vote” 17:51:12 basically put your name against anything you think is a good idea 17:51:15 I'm tempted to get one of those hokey telepresence robots and terrorize the security fishbowls 17:51:29 tmcpeak: excellent contribution :P 17:51:33 lol 17:51:36 you can always do that whether or not you also attend 17:52:01 (might be a novel way to multi-task several sessions simultaneously) 17:52:07 +1 17:52:19 yeah 17:52:30 you don’t have to be going to mark “would attend” next to things :) 17:52:39 It’s just a +1 field basically 17:53:11 does this etherpad also include the vmt? there's usually a session for vmt discussion 17:53:13 So please, especially if you’re going. Make suggestions, I want to get them into the planner by the end of this week. Where there are obvious choices I’ll make them. Where there aren’t we’ll discuss on the ML prior 17:53:46 bknudson: There should definitely be some VMT space there. I’m presuming fishbowl is the preferred option @fungi 17:53:56 Although the last session would have fit in a workroom fine 17:54:09 I think there are some spare workrooms we can request if required 17:54:17 will we have IRC room open for people not in Tokyo? 17:54:17 I hear the workrooms are pretty small this time, 8-10 17:54:29 michaelxin2: #openstack-securty? 17:54:38 hyakuhei: bknudson: it seems like vmt might share the room with stable release session 17:54:39 hyakuhei: we chatted amongst the vmt and are content to wrap those discussions up in other sessions or punt to the ml 17:55:02 or that :) 17:55:09 So long as you’re sure, we’re happy to give time over to VMT activities, they’re pretty critical] 17:55:12 hey tristanC :) 17:55:24 a lot of what we've discussed in past vmt summit sessions have been redundant with or closely linked to stable branch management discussions anyway 17:55:54 but i could see it also possibly fitting into the "how should the project serve the community" session or something 17:56:10 ok great 17:56:40 hyakuhei: i like "Re-entrant policy management for on-cloud applications" good name ;) 17:56:40 the vmt has been making pretty steady progress on transparency without needing to hold discussion to the summit anyway 17:56:40 We’re running out of time, please do suggest sessions peoples (It’s hard with the asian conferences because a lot fewer devs/cores will be there) 17:56:51 is there any specific vmt work that we could maybe make progress on in a workroom? e.g., docs 17:56:59 elmiko: You write the slides, leave the snazzy naming to me ;) 17:57:12 lol 17:57:14 lol 17:57:15 Do we have flyer for OpenStack Security Group? 17:57:25 bknudson: maybe, but most of that we hack on all cycle so i wouldn't want to take up a workroom slot if there's something else worthshilw 17:57:25 if yes, we can handle out for some conference here. 17:57:27 michaelxin2: Nope, we have a deck though :) 17:57:29 er, worthwhile 17:57:35 That’s an interesting idea 17:57:38 I like that a lot 17:57:40 +1 17:57:46 We can get them out on the security track 17:58:01 great idea 17:58:03 Anyone got a pet graphic designer? 17:58:09 ML discussion I guess 17:58:23 Lets wrap before the hard stop so the next guys can start on time 17:58:31 ok, good stuff today 17:58:37 Thank you everyone, especially VMT folks and mhayden 17:58:40 #endmeeting